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Based on a seminal policy paper (Foray et  al., 2009), the Smart Specialisation 
Strategies (S3) approach was integrated into the reformed cohesion policy of the 
European Union for 2014–20. This large-scale European experience provides a 
unique case study of a new type of industrial policy particularly oriented towards 
the modernisation of industrial sectors. In this paper, we briefly review the funda-
mentals of the S3 approach. We identify and discuss the main properties of S3 that 
make it particularly suited to the problem of sectoral modernisation in the context 
of a mature economy. In the final part, we describe the designing of this policy, 
which represents a crucial point: whilst the objective of modernising traditional sec-
tors is not in itself anything new, the way of proceeding within the S3 framework is 
relatively new and innovative.
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1. Introduction
Based on a seminal policy paper (Foray et  al., 2009), the Smart Specialisation 
Strategies (S3) approach was integrated into the reformed cohesion policy of the 
European Union for 2014–20. Member states and regions have developed over 120 
S3s, establishing priorities for research and innovation investments for the 2014–20 
period. Throughout this period more than EUR 40 billion (and more than EUR 65 
billion, including national co-financing) allocated to regions through the European 
Regional Development Fund will fund these priorities (European Commission, 2017).
Moreover, in order to ensure the application and diffusion of the S3 approach 
across regions in Europe, smart specialisation strategies need to be in place (‘ex ante 
conditionality’) before receiving the financial support of the European Regional 
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Development Fund on research and innovation in the 2014–20 period. The impact of 
the S3 concept has thus been immense in terms of the design and implementation of 
regional smart specialisation strategies. This large-scale European experience provides 
a unique case study of a new type of industrial policy particularly oriented towards the 
modernisation of industrial sectors.
While S3 does not focus only on the industrial and economic renewal of traditional 
sectors, many regions have seen it as an opportunity to support the modernisation of 
their traditional sectors. Indeed, a smart specialisation strategy identifies certain objec-
tives regarding structural change, then determines the R&D and innovation activities 
that will enable these objectives to be achieved and finally supports and evaluates these 
so-called ‘transformative’ activities. In fact, in most cases, one or several structural 
change objectives identified by the regions were the modernisation of a particular tra-
ditional sector via innovation and the promotion of critical intangible assets (training, 
management, specialised services). This is why an analysis of this policy fits so well into 
the topic of this special issue.
The challenge of designing and implementing S3 was huge. It particularly con-
cerned the fact of being able to reconcile a logic of strategic choice, selection and 
establishment of priorities for structural changes with a logic of decentralised and 
entrepreneurial information and initiatives. It is this conciliation between two logics, 
which in the past were too often seen as contradictory, that today forms the basis of 
what we can call the new industrial policies—of which S3 is one. Achieving this con-
ciliation is however a delicate undertaking—entailing the invention of a policy design 
based on concepts such as level of granularity (at which priorities are established), 
entrepreneurial discovery or flexibility—and necessitates relatively new institutional 
and organisational forms (at least in the case of regional policies) to put this design 
into practice.
In our position of privileged observer-contributor,2 and taking into account the fact 
that systematic evaluations of the effects of this policy will not be undertaken for sev-
eral years, we think we are able to provide a collection of reflections offering a wealth 
of lessons and information regarding the capacity of regional governmental agencies 
and other actors involved in the innovation system to implement an industrial policy 
aiming at incentivising innovation and supporting modernisation of the mature and 
traditional sectors.
In the first section, we briefly review the fundamentals of the S3 approach. The fol-
lowing section highlights the main properties of S3 that make it particularly suited to 
the problem of sectoral modernisation in the context of a mature economy. The third 
section proposes an analytical framework based on a pragmatic use of the concept of 
market failures. This framework allows us to characterize the policy logic of the S3 
approach—which implies certain principles of policy design that we consider as useful 
in minimizing the risks of such mode of intervention. The final section then describes 
the designing of this policy, which represents a crucial point in this paper: whilst the 
objective of modernising traditional sectors is not in itself anything new (see for exam-
ple Sabel et al., 1987; Dertouzos et al., 1989; Kelley and Arora, 1996; or more recently 
2 Dominique Foray was at the origin of the smart specialisation strategy concept, with Bart Van Ark, 
Paul A. David and Bronwyn Hall, then deeply involved in putting the recommendations resulting from this 
approach into practice. He also contributed to developing the design of this policy at a theoretical level and 
to its translation in terms of policy practices intended for regional agencies.
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Andreoni and Chang, 2016), the way of proceeding within the S3 framework is rela-
tively new and innovative.
2. S3 in a nutshell
2.1. Transformative activities as the main building block of S3
The concept of smart specialisation describes a process: a process aimed at transform-
ing the economic structures of a region or any other geographical unit through the 
formation and development of new transformative activities.
Transformative activity is a key concept. It is neither an individual project nor a 
sector as a whole but rather a collection of innovation capacities and actions that have 
been ‘extracted’ as it were from an existing structure or several structures, to which can 
be added extra-regional capacities and which is oriented towards a certain structural 
change.
The following case will help readers to understand the notion of a transformative 
activity leading to structural change such as the modernisation of a traditional sec-
tor. This concerns the footwear industry in Northern Portugal, which has undergone 
profound renewal in a context of frantic global competition. The strategy imple-
mented by the innovation public agency involved the formation of an activity aimed 
at the development of new forms of flexible automation in the footwear industry. The 
goal was to achieve the integration of engineering knowledge from the University of 
Porto (INESC), skills of companies specialised in industrial machinery, tools and 
software as well as the entrepreneurial vision of a few footwear-manufacturing firms 
which had a good understanding of the urgent need for revival via innovation. The 
integration of this knowledge facilitated the exploration of the potential for auto-
mation associated with advanced cutting tools to increase the flexibility and quality 
of production. Economic experimentation with these technological developments 
resulted in a new business model based on an increase in the variety of designs and 
the capacity to rapidly respond to small orders. This development has led one seg-
ment of the footwear industry in Northern Portugal to bypass global competition 
and become the second most important European producer in terms of exports and 
added value (ADI, 2012).
In this case, the starting point is an existing structure, the transitional path is the 
formation and development of a transformative activity and the objective is a structural 
change (here the modernisation of a traditional sector). We also observe that the trans-
formative activity does not necessarily concern the whole of the sector but a group of 
companies, suppliers and research partners that are prepared to embark upon certain 
forms of collective action in order to transform their capacities.
A transformative activity concentrates the necessary actions—R&D projects, part-
nerships, supply of new specific public goods—to explore the new area of opportunity 
and facilitate the implementation of collective actions between the different innova-
tion actors concerned. The basic operational mode is not necessarily the collaborative 
project but the search for coordination and links between the entities and projects 
concerned, which will facilitate spillovers, economies of scope and scale and the sup-
ply of specific public goods and infrastructures to the domain in question. As such, a 
transformative activity can serve as a catalyst for collective action by firms, suppliers 
and research partners.
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Based on this definition of the transformative activity, designing a smart specialisa-
tion strategy means identifying a small number of transformative activities, which will 
be developed and supported. This portfolio of activities is managed at the regional 
level and possibly modified as new opportunities for structural change arise.
2.2. Spontaneous process of smart specialisation
In some cases the development of a new transformative activity can occur in a sponta-
neous and decentralised way, with great success. It is triggered by entrepreneurial capa-
bilities as well as the manager’s understanding and vision that collective or coordinated 
actions can boost innovation and profitability (Ghemawat, 2017]. Such development 
is likely to generate knowledge spillovers and stimulate the entry and agglomeration 
of firms around the new activity. There are many smart specialisation stories that were 
successful without any policy and which have been extensively studied in widely rang-
ing literature including economics of innovation, business history and historical stud-
ies of technological change (although not under the heading of ‘smart specialisation’).
However, in many cases entrepreneurial and management capabilities are too weak, 
or perhaps the challenges of developing a new transformative activity to explore new 
combinations between capacities and opportunities through some kind of collective 
actions are too great, and the processes described above will not happen, at least not in 
a spontaneous way. A policy is needed to help identify a transformative activity that is 
needed to trigger a structural change and support the growth of such activity.
2.3. Smart specialisation policies: addressing specific capabilities and specific coordination 
problems
Such a policy is characterised by a key fact, which is that it has to address specific 
problems and needs, according to the technology or sector considered. Indeed, the 
construction or development of a transformative activity specific to a sector or technol-
ogy entails the provision of innovation services and infrastructures that are themselves 
specific to this domain and the fulfilment of needs for coordination between actors that 
are also specific. Each transformative activity thus in fact corresponds to a particular policy.
Supporting biotechnology development for fisheries will require the provision of 
capabilities in terms of research, suppliers and services very different from those 
required to support the development of advanced manufacturing technologies for the 
footwear industry or to support the development of ICT for tourism. Such a policy 
has to deal with the complexity and specificity of each activity and this has a cost. 
But according to Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), it is unavoidable. Innovation policy 
cannot be limited to the provision of generic capabilities and infrastructures: ‘the idea 
that a Government can disengage from specific policies and just focus on general framework 
conditions in a sector neutral way is an illusion based on the disregard for the specificity and 
complexity of the requisite publicly provided inputs and capabilities in specific domains’.
2.4. Why ‘specialisation’?
We have just highlighted that such policy involves addressing specific capabilities, 
infrastructures and coordination problems in terms of technologies and sectors. It 
then becomes clear that a regional government whose governance capacities are by 
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definition limited will not be able to achieve this for all sectors.3 Choices must be made. 
Furthermore, essential determinants of the productivity of activities dedicated to inno-
vation are scale, critical mass, and a sufficient agglomeration of actors. It is problems 
regarding the indivisibility of the R&D infrastructure and methods of circulating and 
recombining ideas and knowledge that give large-scale systems—for example urban 
centres—an indisputable comparative advantage when it comes to innovation. Thus 
each region will be well advised to possess some kind of critical masses of innovation 
actors, but here too a medium-sized region will be unable to obtain them everywhere.4 
Again choices must be made. There is therefore a double rationale—critical mass and 
political feasibility—to justify a specialisation strategy.
However, the logic of smart specialisation does not mean that ‘all the rest’ should 
be neglected. The most generic and horizontal policies naturally remain essential and 
smart specialisation becomes an additional option that regions are well advised to acti-
vate if they are capable of setting up an intelligent process of identification of priorities 
(i.e. transformative activities) and development of these activities.
3. From S3 to structural changes
What are the properties that make S3 seem well adapted to the objectives of modern-
ising traditional sectors? These properties concern the way in which a transformative 
activity is constructed, based on the following four arguments:
- a broad conception of innovation, which is not reduced to high tech and scientific 
invention,
- a central role played by general purpose technologies, which attach great importance 
to the processes of the adoption and co-invention of new technologies,
- particular attention paid to the complementarity between the subsidised R&D and 
innovation projects and the training of the specialised human capital necessary for 
conducting these projects,
- the possibility of linking innovation objectives and diffusion objectives within the 
framework of the transformative activity.
3.1. What sort of innovation and capabilities are to be promoted through the development 
of a transformative activity?
Structural changes might follow different logics—we talk of modernisation, transi-
tion, diversification and radical foundation (Foray, 2015). As far as modernisation 
3 This point was made very well by Matsuyama (1997): ‘ Understanding the basic principles of coordination 
problems does not take one very far in the direction of useful, practical conclusions about how to construct technology 
policy. Understanding the basic problems, one is led to a new but not simpler set of questions: what activities in what 
firms are complementary and need to be coordinated and in what way? An appropriate choice of policy tools requires 
a detailed understanding of the externalities and the innovative complementarities involved.’ This is obviously a rel-
evant comment but it should be not taken as an argument to stop any policy intervention aimed at address-
ing specific capabilities and specific infrastructures to support the formation of a specific transformative 
activity (Aghion et al., 2009).
4 Critical mass is a relative measure. The absolute amount of resources that need to be invested to boost 
innovation depends upon many factors that are specific to the technological field or industry involved 
(Trajtenberg, 2002). In some cases, the amount of resources is likely to be huge (and thus not attainable by 
any medium-sized region). In other cases, this amount of resources is not ‘big’, as for instance in regions 
specialising in the co-invention of ICT applications for a specific sector (see next section on the role of 
general purpose technologies).
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of a traditional sector is concerned, this implies that the reality of innovation is not 
reduced to high-tech and cutting-edge research. In the realm of innovation, there is 
not only one game in town, in the sense of fundamental invention in a few key enabling 
technologies. Innovation is widely distributed over the whole spectrum of sectors (not 
just high tech) and invention processes (not only formal R&D). For many regions, 
the point is not inventing at the frontier but rather generating innovation complemen-
tarities in existing sectors. These types of complementarities are perhaps less excit-
ing and flamboyant, but they ultimately represent the key to economy-wide growth 
in regional economies (Trajtenberg, 2010). This means that a transformative activity, 
depending on what the objective of transformation is, can involve actions like training 
programmes, the formation of new managerial and engineering skills, quality control 
and certification processes as well as technology adoption—all these actions are per-
haps less ostentatious than supporting high-tech start-ups but are the components of 
a coherent and full-fledged transformative activity aimed at profoundly transforming 
the structures of traditional industries.
3.2. The centrality of general purpose technologies
The specific properties of general purpose technologies (GPTs) complete this broad-
ened vision of innovation (above) in a coherent fashion and therefore play an impor-
tant role in helping secondary regions to combine their existing capacities with new 
opportunities (Bresnahan, 2010). Central features of a GPT are horizontal propaga-
tion throughout the economy and complementarity between the invention of the GPT 
and the development of applications that are related to specific sectors. Most often, 
GPTs do not offer the complete innovative outcome, but the recombination of GPTs 
with complementary technologies enables the creation of new innovative solutions. 
Expressed in economists’ language, the invention of a GPT extends the frontier of 
invention possibilities for the whole economy, while application development changes 
the production function of one particular sector. Myriad economically important 
innovations result, therefore, from the ‘co-invention’ of applications. Moreover, the 
dynamics of a GPT may be spatially distributed between regions specialised in basic 
inventions and regions investing in specific application domains that are related to 
existing structures. While a few leading regions can invest in the invention of a GPT 
or the combination of different GPTs (such as bioinformatics), follower regions and 
laggards are often better advised to invest in the ‘co-invention of applications’, i.e. the 
development of the applications of a GPT in one or several important domains of the 
regional economy.
There is, therefore, an important theoretical relationship between smart specialisa-
tion as a process of diversification and modernisation of economic structures and the 
potential of opportunities offered by such GPTs in any region.
3.3. Securing human capital supply as demand for R&D increases
The construction of the transformative activity needs to take into account Romer’s 
well-known argument regarding the correct sequencing of policy programmes: it is 
not enough to increase spending on R&D, but what needs to be supported is the total 
quantity of inputs that go into R&D: ‘In fact, any generous subsidies will fail in adding 
more R&D if the supply curve of human capital is fixed and was not adjusted through early 
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training programmes. In such case the increase of demand for R&D induced by policy will 
translate into a proportional increase in wages for R&D scientists with no increase in the level 
of R&D activities’ (Romer, 2000). Romer rightly emphasises here the importance of 
a correct sequencing of policy programmes. The consideration of the complementari-
ties between human capital and demand for R&D should help to focus on the correct 
sequencing of the policy: the formation of specialised human capital and capabilities 
should precede, or at least occur at the same time as, the programmes aimed at increas-
ing the demand for R&D in the specialised domain in question.
3.4. Coupling innovation (vitality) and diffusion (inclusion)
As the objective of a transformative activity is the modernisation of a traditional sector, 
the construction of the transformative activity should avoid a systematic allocative bias 
in favour of high-tech innovations, even if these high-tech innovations are related to 
the traditional sector. Policies aimed at promoting rocket science and high-tech entre-
preneurship will hardly have an impact on the traditional sector unless another com-
plementary, say ‘adoption-oriented’, policy is designed and implemented. Based on a 
high-tech policy only, entrepreneurial activities are going to be stimulated and this will 
be beneficial to a small part of the regional economy—a few indicators will improve, 
and not the least important ones (patent, VC attractions, highly skilled jobs)—but the 
modernisation/inclusion effect will be negligible and the gap between the dynamic part 
and the non-dynamic part of the economy will increase.
The point is therefore to develop an integrated vision of the transformative activity 
that must not focus only on the high-tech dimension of the structural change sought. 
The activity must also integrate actions that allow the adoption of high tech by the 
sector that will be a potential user. Thus, for example, a transformative activity that 
concerns a certain number of scientific innovation projects for agriculture must also 
include the actions (adoptions, training, management) that will facilitate the adoption 
of high tech by the traditional sector. The point here is to involve the agri-food sector 
as a huge reservoir of potential adopters of these new technologies. The goal is there-
fore twofold: encourage young innovative firms by equipping their ecosystem with all 
the necessary capabilities AND address the innovational complementarities between 
the high-tech and traditional sectors. The latter goal involves addressing human capi-
tal and capability problems, fixing the adoption externalities, addressing coordination 
failures and providing some specific public goods; in other words, it will address many 
barriers and obstacles to innovation diffusion in a traditional sector. If this is not done, 
the activity will remain limited to start-ups and will lose its truly transformative nature.
The development of an integrated vision of a transformative activity—not just 
reduced to high tech—reminds us of Phelps’s argument about dynamism and inclu-
sion (Phelps, 2006): a policy to promote both dynamism and inclusion is not a policy 
that would support pushing more resources into the economy (more research infra-
structure, more human capital), because these resources will ultimately be largely 
captured by the top science/high-tech ecosystem, but instead it aims at pulling some 
existing resources (of the traditional sectors) into innovation activities. This is exactly 
what is happening in the agri-food case described above: the transformative activity 
is a mechanism to pull economic agents from the traditional sector into the innova-
tive part of the economy through various programmes and actions involving training, 
management skills and adoption of new technologies. In this sense S3 is an inclusive 
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policy because the strategic domains and transformative activities that are identified 
and selected are not limited a priori to a certain part of the economy.
4. Framework: from ‘standard’ market failures to coordination and 
directionality failures
Certain innovation policy goals—such as accelerating innovation to modernize a tra-
ditional sector—imply a change in the degree and nature of innovation and research 
policies that have dominated the policy landscape in the past thirty years. These poli-
cies have been characterized by a moderate degree of interventions and neutral log-
ics of resource allocation—in other words, such policies have deployed programs and 
instruments to support innovation without any pre-determination of the domains, sec-
tors or technologies where these instruments should be used. Our assumption is that 
such types of innovation policy are insufficient in supporting more radical transforma-
tions—such as the modernization of an old industry. It is thus necessary for policy to 
shift to a higher level of intervention, characterized by a higher degree of intentionality 
and prioritization.
This shift can be conceptually explained by using an extended market failure frame-
work: while moderate interventions are used to fix what we can define as ‘stand-
ard market failures’, stronger, non-neutral interventions are needed to address both 
coordination failures as well as directionality failures which are mostly sector- or 
technology-specific.
4.1. Market failure as a starting point
We interpret market failure pragmatically. At a theoretical level, the concept of market 
failure is linked to the formal theory of general competitive equilibrium; it comprises 
the framework of optimising actors, competition, general equilibrium and its counter-
part, the theory of market failure.
Our point here is not theoretical; rather, it follows a recent argument made by 
Winter, which recognises that the language and theory of market failure is a valuable 
resource for building a strong case for innovation policy. The goal is then to impart 
a balanced perspective of market failure and to use it for cases that can satisfy three 
criteria (Winter, 2017):
- The mechanism generating the core market failure problem is relatively simple and 
transparent;
- The nature of the harm is fairly clear; and
- There is relevant experience using non-market organisational arrangements to 
address the problem.
4.2. From standard market failures to coordination and directionality failures
In the domain of innovation, it is obvious that knowledge spillovers, as well as acute 
risk and moral hazard in financing R&D, are cases of market failure that satisfy the 
three criteria. For instance, the whole geographically mediated patent citation liter-
ature has built an extensive base of evidence regarding the existence of knowledge 
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spillovers (see, for instance, and among many, Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996); the mechanism and effect of this market failure are clear. This 
creates a gap between private and social returns, resulting in systematic underinvest-
ment in R&D, which is likely to be detrimental to innovation and productivity growth. 
Additionally, there is relevant experience in non-market organisational arrangements 
to address such a problem. This experience involves, for instance, the creation of pri-
vate institutions by the economic agents themselves to capture the externalities and 
reduce the gap between social and private returns.
Similar to these ‘standard’ market failures, one can identify coordination and col-
lective action failures. Here again, a pragmatic approach invites us to search for cases 
where the sources of failure are clear. They can come from the complementarity of 
investments (each needs the other to be profitable) or from the difficulty of small enti-
ties to join forces in order to collectively produce some industry-specific public goods. 
The negative effects of these failures are also easily identifiable. In many ecosystems of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, one important gap to be addressed by policies is the 
provision of complementary capabilities (or specific public inputs) upon which most 
small and medium companies can draw, even if they have not contributed to their pro-
duction (Berger, 2013). The same kind of non-market organisational arrangement, as 
in the knowledge spillover case, can apply here to address coordination problems. They 
again involve the creation of private institutions by the economic agents themselves 
in order to solve collective action problems resulting from the provision of specific 
public goods. Weder and Grubel (1993) identify the importance of such a mechanism 
in the innovation systems of two countries (Japan and Switzerland). In a similar vein, 
Romer (1993) builds a model of specific public goods provision, based on a hybrid 
institutional arrangement that combines public intervention and a decentralized mar-
ket process.
The final type of failure that is important to consider could be called ‘directionality 
failure’, a new term to describe an old and well-recognised problem (Chataway, et al., 
2017): innovation does not necessarily happen where it is socially desirable. While a 
certain rate of innovation might be found to be sufficient in sustaining productivity 
growth in the economy in general, it can appear to be insufficient in some domains 
in which accelerating innovation is an imperative for certain reasons (such as in the 
case of modernisation of an old industry, etc.). The policy goal then is not merely to 
address market failure and incentivise innovation in the general economy, but to do it 
in a specific way within certain domains or directions. Some policies can address the 
rate of innovation within the entire economy, while others need to address both the 
rate and direction—or, more precisely, the rate in a certain direction of invention and 
innovation.
We began this section by offering a pragmatic vision of market failure because such a 
categorization forms the basis of two policy logics. The first category of ‘standard mar-
ket failures’ (including essentially knowledge-positive externalities and risk and moral 
hazard in financing innovation) provides policymakers with the possibility to limit their 
actions to neutral interventions. Indeed, these market failures are generic and apply 
to any firm in an undifferentiated way. There are of course sectoral variations in the 
potential importance of these standard market failures across sectors, but economists 
recognize (in principle) the generality of these market failures in the economy—which 
opens the possibility of generalising the application of policy instruments within the 
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entire economy (R&D tax credits, R&D subsidies, patents). This has positive implica-
tions in terms of administration and monitoring costs, as well as in terms of evaluating 
the effects of such a neutral treatment.
Conversely, coordination and directionality failures are sector- or technology-
specific by nature, and therefore imply non-neutral policies involving targeted inter-
ventions to fix these coordination or direction problems in certain ways. This is the 
logic of an S3 approach.5 However, such a logic is full of risks. Adopting non-neutral 
logics of resource allocation, which implies preferential intervention, would result in 
much higher responsibilities for the government. Moreover, such a shift would open 
a Pandora’s box, with all of the ensuing problems that economists fear. As such, S3 as 
well as other policies involving choices and preferential interventions have been seri-
ously criticised (by Schultze [1983] and Krueger [2011], for example, as well as heated 
discussions among economists in The Economist [2010]). Responses to these sceptical 
arguments involve the elaboration of a new policy design to which we turn now.
5. S3 policy design: the centrality of the process of identification of 
priorities and of learning from transformative activities
The way in which the process of choice and selection of priorities is conducted, as 
well as the way in which information concerning the successes and failures of the 
transformative activities is exploited, are essential challenges for the success of S3. 
These are questions of policy design. Our contribution on the search for an appropri-
ate policy design for S3 is original even if significantly inspired by the works of Rodrik. 
It identifies the three major problems that any targeting and strategic policy prioritisa-
tion is likely to encounter and that are the source of the different kinds of scepticism 
mentioned above:
- how to go about establishing priorities,
- how to develop transformative activity within the framework of the established 
priority,
- what the implications of a policy that is by its very nature experimental are
and suggests solutions, principles of policy design—based on the literature on technol-
ogy policy and the detailed and meticulous observation of the trials and errors experi-
enced in the context of the setting up of S3.
5.1. Establishing priorities
Designing an S3 involves establishing priorities to support preferential interventions. 
This is the rule for a non-neutral policy! How can this process be made as innocuous 
as possible, which means in particular minimising distortions and avoiding policy cap-
ture problems and the monopolisation of resources by a small number of motivated 
actors? There are two principles that seem to us to be important.
5 The regional innovation system approach was of course a valuable development, recognising the need 
to build an institutional framework for innovation at the regional level, but this approach remains largely 
neutral and undifferentiated regarding regions’ specificities. There were exceptions of course, but horizon-
tal policy (or sector-neutral policy) was the main logic underlying resource allocation in the framework of 
regional and cohesion policy.
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5.1.1. Level of granularity. The selection of priorities must be carried out not at the 
sector level but at the level of activities that transform these sectors or establish new 
ones. This level—known as transformative activities—is thus one of intermediate gran-
ularity, finer grained than sectors but coarser grained than individual entities. For 
example a ‘correct’ priority should not be the footwear industry as a sector but rather 
the development of flexible manufacturing technologies for the footwear industry, as 
in the case mentioned in Section 1. This is the level that best reveals the domains in 
which a region should position itself. This intermediate level of aggregation also allows 
the defining of priority domains (transformative activities) that are not too extensive. 
In an activity that is too broad—one designated ‘energy’, for example—the 12 or 15 
projects that are selected and supported are scattered and dispersed. Connections, 
synergies and spillovers will hardly happen and critical mass will not emerge. In a nar-
rower priority area, the same number of projects will be more connected, providing 
potential scale, scope and spillover effects. Some platforms will be ‘general-purpose’, 
and the markets for specialised inputs (skills and services) will become thick. There is, 
of course, a political rationale underlying the need for broad areas (the so-called ‘cof-
fee for all’), but this is not the right way to proceed because, at the end of the day, the 
region will not get what an S3 is supposed to deliver.
5.1.2. Public-private interactions. The identification of transformative activities is based 
on a process of interactions and dialogue between the government, public sector and 
private sector, backed up by evidence concerning the regional economy and knowl-
edge concerning the region’s entrepreneurial activities and capacities. There is no 
magic solution to avoid problems of policy capture by ‘regulars’ and those with the 
most influence. In the context of S3, it is a question of establishing a decentralised and 
transparent process in order to identify the desired structural changes, the transforma-
tive activities that could lead to them and the capacities and potentials that enable the 
selected activities to be initiated in a credible manner. All of this contributes to the 
selection of a small number of unique combinations between existing capacities and 
new opportunities for transforming regional structures.
5.1.3. A central process. John Enos wrote very pertinently—long before the era of smart 
specialisation—that it is useful and productive for regions to put more effort into dis-
covering and choosing, in detail and for the future, priority areas for R&D and inno-
vation (Enos, 1995). The reason is that the knowledge and experience acquired from 
discovering and choosing the right directions for R&D and innovation can be valuable 
in carrying out the subsequent stages of product/process/market design, production 
and distribution.
The idea is therefore that the process by which priorities and transformative activi-
ties can be identified is not a process on which resources must be economised or that 
should be speeded up at all costs. Neither is it a process that should be ‘confiscated’ by 
the government. But it is a process of learning about the capacities and opportunities 
specific to the region’s economy that is useful and productive. And as such, it lies at 
the very heart of S3.
5.2. Developing a transformative activity
Once a priority (a transformative activity) has been identified, the standard modus 
operandi for policy is to deploy all sorts of policy instruments in order to support the 
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exploration of the new area of opportunities, provide the specific public goods that 
are needed (training, basic research, services) as well as coordination devices to assist 
the formation of networks and partnerships. There is nothing new here: R&D and 
human capital policy tools as well as cluster policy tools can be deployed, but there is 
an important qualification: these tools address the specific development of a quite nar-
rowly defined activity aimed at a particular structural transformation. We have already 
mentioned, in the previous section, some of the important conditions allowing a trans-
formative activity to play its role of structural change to the full. We must also mention 
the design principle, which can guide policymakers in the deployment of the different 
instruments and programmes to support the emergence and development of a trans-
formative activity.
5.2.1. Tinbergen assignment theorem. How can we be sure that supporting the develop-
ment of transformative activity will not result in a piling up of useless instruments that 
are poorly coordinated and ultimately costly? Respecting the previously mentioned 
design principles—for example the integrated vision of a priority that involves sup-
porting not only breakthrough innovations but also the management and absorption 
capacities of sectors that are potential users—is likely to produce an over-elaborate 
policy. A design principle is essential here. It is the one known as the Tinbergen assign-
ment theorem that provides at least first-order guidance on the ‘number’ of instruments 
or programmes that need to be deployed according to the goals or targets. The number 
of externalities or market failures should determine the number of instruments (Jaffe 
et al., 2004). If we again take the transformation of the agri-food sector, there is a need 
for instruments to support research and start-ups (because of knowledge externalities 
as well as capital market imperfections) and instruments to support adoption in the 
traditional sector (because of adoption and network externalities as well as training 
externalities). Finally, coordination failures can happen at the interface between the 
high-tech and traditional sectors and this would also need to be fixed through other 
instruments (for example a platform of specialised services to support transfer of tech-
nologies). All in all the support of the transformative activity in this special S3 case 
should therefore involve about five instruments to be implemented in a coordinated 
way. And it is because some sceptical economists will ask—how can the government 
manage such complexity? (see footnote 3)—that the latter must choose and deter-
mine a small number of transformative activities that must be supported. ‘Doomed to 
choose’, Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) tell us!
5.3. Experimental policy
We know from history that any pretext given to the government for setting priorities 
and establishing strategic targets increases the risk that the whole policy will become a 
central planning exercise based on a principal-agent governance and resulting in very 
poor information flows from the bottom. Rodrik (2013) puts the argument very well: 
‘the agency framework assumes that the principals already have a very good idea of what 
needs to be done to achieve public goals, and all that needs to be done is to provide the agents 
(firms) with the right incentives to carry out the requisite investments’.
It is therefore crucial to recognise the experimental nature of any S3. The objectives 
targeted represent by definition experiments; some will work and some won’t. Each 
one of the transformative activities initiated is a gamble! These risks imply certain 
design principles.
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5.3.1. Entrepreneurial discovery. The application of the entrepreneurial discovery prin-
ciple fundamentally reflects the experimental nature of each transformative activity. 
As concrete exploration and coordination actions advance (projects, partnership, plat-
form, training), entrepreneurial discovery operates at two levels—projects (success, 
failure) and the transformative activity in its entirety—is it growing, will it lead to 
the hoped-for structural change? The centrality of entrepreneurial discovery in the 
development of a transformative activity stems from the fact that initially there is no 
complete knowledge regarding the way in which the process of the emergence and 
development of this activity is going to unfold. It is as R&D investments, projects 
and coordination actions develop that the potential of the transformative activity, the 
probabilities of success of the different projects and actions, will be revealed. Unlike 
in the case of a neutral policy, one cannot apply here the standard principal-agent logic 
that supposes that the government has sufficient information to construct a plan and 
provide the incentives necessary for firms to carry it out (Sabel, 2004, p. 3). We talk 
of entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner, 1997), as this term comprises a crucial learn-
ing dimension regarding the real possibilities of development and structural effect 
offered by the transformative activities. There are successes, failures and surprises. 
Integration of the entrepreneurial discovery concept in an industrial policy design was 
first achieved by Haussmann and Rodrik (2002). This represents an essential step 
forward in enabling industrial policies to avoid the tragedy of centralised planning, in 
other words reconciling a logic of vertical choice and priorities with a logic of decen-
tralised and entrepreneurial information and initiatives.
5.3.2. Flexibility. The transformative activities thus identified must not be seen as unal-
terable structures but rather as pioneering ventures and experiments. The flexibility of 
the strategy is therefore a requirement. What is learned thanks to the entrepreneurial 
discovery must exert a retroactive effect on the characteristics of the programmes 
within each transformative activity and also on the activities themselves to modify or 
possibly discontinue them. Moreover, new combinations can emerge at any time and 
must be integrated in the form of new priorities. The flexibility of the strategy imposes 
control and evaluation mechanisms that are essential for the conducting of the strategy. 
Monitoring is a key element and any transformative activity needs to be measured in 
order to understand performance, the degree of progress, the direction and magnitude 
of changes as well as potential failures and structural deficiencies and to indicate that 
some issues warrant further investigation. One key feature of such indicators is to 
provide an up-to-the-minute barometer of the activity that can be used for immediate 
feedback and adjustment of the policy (Feldman et al., 2014).6
5.3.3. Spillovers. The social value of a process of entrepreneurial discovery is that it 
informs the whole system about new opportunities, potential success and failures; i.e. 
what are the directions of R&D and innovation that are likely to generate the desirable 
6 Rammer’s recent works provide a good basis for the development of subsidy mechanisms for R&D 
projects allowing a certain flexibility in the allocation of resources: instead of one single financing decision, 
made at the start of the project, Rammer elaborates a multiple and sequential decision model that allows 
projects that are not working to be interrupted sooner and the volume of financing allocated to those that 
are progressing to be increased (Rammer and Klingebiel, 2012).
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structural changes? The maximisation of informational spillovers created by the discov-
ery phase is a key design principle that distinguishes entrepreneurial discoveries sup-
ported by a public policy, as is the case here, from those made privately within firms 
that will tend not to diffuse this information. Companies—usually large ones—are 
looking for new strategic domains and ways to explore them concretely. However, the 
difference between a process of entrepreneurial discovery internalised in a company 
and a process of entrepreneurial discovery embedded in a public policy is obvious. In 
the former case, the social value of the process will be lower than in the latter.
When the entrepreneurial discovery process is supported by a public policy, it is crit-
ical that the informational value of the process be maximised. The companies that are 
supported in joining the entrepreneurial discovery process must accept and conform to 
these rules of information and audit. This creates a design issue: the reward for the entre-
preneurial discovery should be structured in a way that maximises the spillovers to the 
other participants and potential entrants in the transformative activity (Rodrik, 2004).
5.4. The general nature of the policy design
The various policy design elements described above are helpful in order to set up a 
transparent, robust and flexible process for the establishment of priorities, construc-
tion of the transformative activities and promotion of decentralised information and 
entrepreneurial initiatives. This policy based on such design principles is neither purely 
bottom-up (because at some points priorities are chosen by the government) nor 
totally top-down (because a few design principles—entrepreneurial discovery process, 
public-private interactions—introduce a strong bottom-up component). It is rather an 
intermediate process aiming to enhance entrepreneurial coordination within a frame-
work (a small number of priority areas and transformative activities) structured by the 
government that pursues an objective of industrial modernisation.
6. Conclusion
This article has developed the case of S3, recently adopted and implemented in Europe 
as part of the EU’s cohesion policies, to examine how this type of policy constitutes an 
appropriate solution to problems posed by the modernisation of the traditional sectors 
of mature economies.
We have seen that the concept of transformative activity is central in this respect. 
The morphology of a transformative activity is neither that of a sector nor that of an 
individual project but rather corresponds to a collection of innovation capacities and 
actions, which have been ‘extracted’ as it were from an existing structure or several 
structures, and which are oriented towards a certain process of modernisation.
We have also observed that the development of a transformative activity must com-
ply with certain principles for its structural impact to be fully achieved: broadened 
vision of innovation, centrality of GPTs, correct sequence of actions regarding the 
training of human capital and R&D incentives, transformative activity that cannot be 
reduced to high tech but that also includes the actions of diffusion of innovation and 
improvement of skills and management in sectors that are potential users of high tech.
We have finally insisted on other policy design principles that are important for the 
establishment of priorities (to minimise distortions and increase transparency in the 
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prioritisation process) and with regard to the experimental dimension of this policy 
(entrepreneurial discovery, flexibility and monitoring, spillovers).
All these design principles represent challenges that must encourage public agencies 
to invent new structures and change their political practices and culture.
Numerous cases of regional S3s show that the interim assessment is not negative 
(Morgan, 2016; Navarro et al., 2011). Many regions have been able to adapt or trans-
form their policy process to respond to some of these challenges. A new policy mind-
set is slowly being instilled into policymakers—comprising prioritisation and vertical 
choice instead of neutral and horizontal programmes; decentralisation, self-discovery 
and flexibility rather than central planning; transformative activities rather than secto-
ral priorities. It seems to us that this is an important message in view of the resurgence 
of these new industrial policies oriented towards the modernisation of traditional sec-
tors in mature economies.
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